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ABSTRACT: Kant’s juridical thought enjoys renewed attention and his reading on Natural 
Law provides for a better possible understanding of it, with the emergence of the crucial 
distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom, and the difference of freedom and 
morality from simple rationality and moral sentiment. 
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Kant’s lectures on Natural Law1 do not only offer a contribution to the 
Kantian philology, but also extend a better understanding of Kant’s 
                                                            
* This work was originally presented as a paper at the XXVII World Congress of the 
International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Washington, 
DC, 27 July-1 August 2015, on the subject of Law, Reason and Emotion. Kant’s works are 
cited according to the volume and page of the Akademie-Ausgabe. 
1 The first critical edition of these lectures has been published in the following 
volumes: H. Delfosse-N. Hinske-G. Sadun Bordoni, Kant-Index, Band 30, Teilband I: 
Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 2010; Teilband II: 
Abhandlung des Naturrecht Feyerabend: Text und Hauptindex, 2014; Teilband III: 
Abhandlung des Naturrechts Feyerabend: Konkordanz und Sonderindices, 2014. Cf. the 
German-Italian edition: I. Kant, Lezioni sul diritto naturale, edited by N. Hinske and G. 
Sadun Bordoni, Milano, Bompiani, 2016. This edition constitutes the basis for numerous 
translations which are about to be published, beginning with the American one, by 
Rauscher, forthcoming in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant. See F. Rauscher’s 
review, on the Kant Review, 17 (2), 2012, p. 357-365. 
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juridical thought and its evolution in a moment in which this thought is at 
the center of a renewed attention. Indeed, there is no doubt that the 
perspective of the Kantian normativity (equidistant from both utilitarianism 
and metaphysical-theological ethics) enjoyed a resurgence in recent decades, 
a renewal of its important philosophical role. From Rawls and Habermas 
onwards the renewed centrality of Kant in the philosophical-juridical and 
political debate is an established fact.  
The importance of these lectures, known as Naturrecht Feyerabend, 
which precede The Doctrine of Right by 13 years, stems especially from the 
fact that they were delivered while Kant was completing the Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals and while he was preparing the writing What is 
Enlightenment?. These constitute therefore a ‘laboratory’ of essential topics 
of Kant’s moral and juridical philosophy and contain precedents of later 
writings, not only of the Doctrine of Right but also of Perpetual Peace. But 
the importance is not only historical. Through these lectures, which until 
now were almost unknown, it is possible to highlight essential topics of 
Kantian thought, beginning with the idea that the old natural law theory 
confuses laws of nature and laws of freedom, and that principles of law and 
morals cannot be based on either simple rationality or on the so-called 
‘moral sentiment’.  
Here I will omit philological considerations and refer to the 
aforementioned critical edition of the Naturrecht Feyerabend. The problem 
that I would like to discuss is how a different approach to the legal thought 
of Kant, including its evolution and based upon the manuscript legacy and 
lectures, can improve our comprehension of it and in particular can help us 
to better understand Kant’s relationship with the tradition of natural law. 
On this topic there are two preconceptions that should be criticized: 
1) The first is that Kant’s legal thought is a ‘senile’ product of secondary 
interest and essentially foreign to the ‘critical’ philosophy. This judgment 
dates back to Schopenhauer and was not set aside by the Neo-kantianism 
at the end of the nineteenth century, nor by contemporary thinkers who 
were very interested in Kant’s practical thinking, such as Hannah Arendt. 
2) The second preconception is that Kant’s theses, regarding ethical and 
legal topics, represent a radical break with the tradition of natural law. This 
thesis goes back to Gustav Hugo, also Kant’s great admirer, and therefore is 
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linked to the foundation of the historical school of Jurisprudence, from 
which derives the first historiographical elaboration of Hugo’s theses.2 
Regarding the first point, the analysis of the remaining manuscripts 
and lectures show how the main theses of Kant’s ethical-legal thought had 
already been defined many years before publication, in 1793, of the script 
On the Common Saying, which contains its first articulated exposition, and 
of the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797. This can be observed by examining, 
first of all, the so-called Bemerkungen, the lectures on ethics of the 
Seventies, and especially the lectures on natural law known as Naturrecht 
Feyerabend (1784), where the critical discussion of the traditional natural 
law is widely present. Kant’s main criticism concerns the absence of a 
distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom, and that only in 
the latter could be found the basis of right (AA, XXVII, 1322). In 
Naturrecht Feyerabend the concept of the right is defined as: “Right is that 
restriction of freedom according to which it can coexist with every other 
freedom according to a universal rule” (AA, XXVII, 1320). This classical 
Kantian definition clearly shows the continuity of his legal thought: it is 
already present in the Reflections of the Sixties,3 it is clearly expressed with 
reference to Rousseau, in the Bemerkungen,4 and it is foreshadowed in a 
couple of passages of the Critique of Pure Reason,5 with known reference to 
the platonic republic. 
It is then defined, as before mentioned, in the lectures of the Eighties, 
before appearing practically unchanged, in the writings of the Nineties, On 
the Common Saying6 and Metaphysik der Sitten, whose Universal Principle of 
Right states “Eine jede Handlung ist Recht, die oder nach deren Maxime die 
Freiheit der Willkür eines jeden mit jedermanns Freiheit nach einem 
                                                            
2 Cf. O. von Gierke, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen 
Staatstheorie, Breslau, Koebner, 1880. F. Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000. 
3 Cf. e.g. Refl. 6596 (AA, XIX, 101): “Alle Handlung des Rechts ist ein maximum 
der freyen Willkühr, wenn sie gegenseitig genommen wird”. 
4 Actio spectata secundum voluntatem hominum communem si sibimet ipsi contradicat 
est externe moraliter impossibilis (illibitum) […] Contradiceret hominum voluntas sibimet 
ipsi si vellent quod ex voluntate communi abhorrerent (AA, XX, 161). 
5 “Eine Verfassung von der größten menschlichen Freiheit nach Gesetzen, welche 
machen, daß jedes Freiheit mit der andern ihrer zusammen bestehen kann, […]ist doch 
wenigstens eine nothwendige Idee, die man nicht bloß im ersten Entwurfe einer 
Staatsverfassung, sondern auch bei allen Gesetzen zum Grunde legen muß” (AA, III, 247-8). 
6 “Recht ist die Einschränkung der Freiheit eines jeden auf die Bedingung ihrer 
Zusammenstimmung mit der Freiheit von jedermann, in so fern diese nach einem 
allgemeinen Gesetze möglich ist” (AA, VIII, 289-90). 
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allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann” (“Any action is right if it can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on 
its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law”: AA, VI, 230; transl. M. Gregor). 
From this example of great importance, it can be understood how 
Kant’s legal thought took shape early on, and how it is independent from 
the ‘critical turning point’, which only concerns the development of 
theoretical thought. This surely does not negate that the critical turning 
point had played an important role also in the deepening of the Kantian 
moral thought (suffice to mention the solution of the Third Antinomy 
which shows how the contrast between nature and freedom could be 
resolved). But it shows that the development of Kant’s thought, in the 
moral area, is understood better as a continuous development and 
deepening than in terms of a radical break. Regarding the legal thought in 
particular, Ritter was the first to suggest its early formation. But from this 
correct premise, he drew the (in my assessement) incorrect conclusion that 
the Kantian legal thought is fully within the classical tradition of natural 
law theory.7 Instead, I argue that the early emergence of the distinction 
between laws of nature and laws of freedom, around which Kant criticizes 
the natural law theory, shows that Kant’s departure from this tradition had 
been developed early as well.8 
As regards the second point, it is important to notice that this 
doubtlessly radical criticism does not imply the complete abandonment of 
the natural law theory, but rather its transformation. In Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, also published in 1784, Kant 
first applied his ethic-legal view to the world of history claiming that the 
transcendental basis of right must find full realization in history in a 
“vollkommen gerechte bürgerliche Verfassung” (“perfectly just civil 
constitution”: AA, VIII, 22). Such civil constitution will be indicated in 
the Contest of Faculties, as a “naturrechtliche Verfassung” (“constitution 
founded on natural law”: AA, VII, 87). And it is generally clear, as stated by 
Kant in Rechtslehre, that “under a civil constitution the statutory laws 
obtaining in this condition cannot infringe upon natural right (ie: that 
                                                            
7 Cf. C. Ritter, Der Rechtsgedanke Kants nach den frühen Quellen, Frankurt a.M., 
Klostermann, 1971. 
8 For an extended analysis, I refer to my Leggi della natura e leggi della libertà. Kant e 
il giusnaturalismo, to be soon published in the acts of the 15th International Colloquium 
of the Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee of the CNR, on the 
subject of Nomos and Lex. 
Some Notes on Law, Reason and Moral Sentiment in the Kantian Lectures on Natural Law 
 205 
right which can be derived from a priori principles for a civil constitution)” 
(AA, VI, 256; transl. M. Gregor). The promotion of freedom – the only 
innate right – is the end of the right, which also represents the realization 
of the intrinsic value of the world.9 
We will now briefly examine how this position reflects on the specific 
topic of this paper. The very meaning of freedom explains why, in the 
Kantian perspective, right cannot be based on moral sentiment, not even 
on simple reason. At the beginning, Kant was influenced by Hutcheson 
and by the theory of moral sentiment. However, Kant’s mature position is 
that sentiment cannot be the basis of a universally valid moral obligation, 
since moral obligation in its turn cannot depend on such a variable 
element. What we call moral sentiment is rather a consequence of moral law, 
and not its foundation. 
Less well known is that, according to Kant, even reason cannot be the 
source of right and morality. The clarity with which this theme appears in 
the introduction to Naturrecht Feyerabend is one of the point of interest in 
these lectures on natural law. Man being an end in himself does not depend 
on reason, states Kant, but on freedom: “It would be possible for man to 
bring about through reason, without freedom, according to universal laws 
of nature, that which the animal brings about through instinct” (AA, 
XXVII, 1321-22). Reason, says Kant with great acuity, it might simply be 
something similar to animal instincts (as Hume had stated, and as many 
still consider today), which wouldn’t attribute to man his incomparable 
dignity: “But freedom, only freedom means that we are ends in 
themselves”. Freedom must however be limited, this is the essence of right. 
Since such a limitation cannot come from nature, freedom must limit itself, 
must be its own law. 
Such theme is very clear in Naturrecht Feyerabend and it is also 
mentioned in the Critique of Practical Reason, which states that being an 
animal does not influence us to the point of not understanding that reason 
is not only a tool to satisfy the needs: “Denn im Werthe über die bloße 
Thierheit erhebt ihn das gar nicht, daß er Vernunft hat, wenn sie ihm nur 
zum Behuf desjenigen dienen soll, was bei Thieren der Instinct verrichtet” 
(“That he has reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere 
                                                            
9 Cf. Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie, edited by W. Stark, Berlin-New York, W. de 
Gruyter, 2004, p. 177. 
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animality if reason serves only the purpose which, among animals, are taken 
care by instinct”; transl. L. W. Beck).10  
On this basis, Kant traces in the Metaphysiscs of Morals the crucial 
distinction between ‘being rational’, Vernunftwesen, which we can only 
understand according to the incomparable property of freedom, and simply 
‘being reasonable’, vernünftiges Wesen, that is, being in possession of 
reason, In fact, the possession of reason, “based on its theoretical faculties, 
it may also be a quality of a living being”,11 or in other words may be a 
‘disposition’ which is simply natural (Naturanlage). In the latter case, in 
being rational, animal rationale, man would always be the means for 
general objectives of nature, and not an end in himself. The above 
argument confirms that, as Kant himself states in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, freedom is the cornerstone (Schlußstein) of his entire philosophy. 
It is well known that freedom, in the mature position of Kant, is a ‘fact of 
reason’, something that is undoubtedly witnessed by the moral law, despite 
the fact that the roots of our freedom are still unknown. This is not the 
proper occasion to discuss how this perspective, perhaps still today, might 
diminish the reductionist challenge of scientific determinism. 
Finally, I would like to recall that Kant, through the critique of 
traditional natural law, affirms a distinction between laws of nature and 
laws of freedom, or ‘moral laws’, which lay the basis for ethics and right. 
Therefore, they don’t depend neither upon sentiment nor upon simple 
reason, and go beyond the reductive definition of man as animal rationale 
and the ambiguous attempt to value beyond measure the uncertain and 
variable emotional world of man. 
REFERENCES 
Delfosse, Heinrich P.-Hinske, Norbert-Sadun Bordoni, Gianluca, Kant-Index, Band 30, 
Teilband I: Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 
2010; Teilband II: Abhandlung des Naturrecht Feyerabend: Text und Hauptindex, 
2014; Teilband III: Abhandlung des Naturrechts Feyerabend: Konkordanz und 
Sonderindices, 2014. 
Gierke von, Otto Friedrich, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen 
Staatstheorie, Breslau, Koebner, 1880.  
Kant, Immanuel, Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie, edited by Werner Stark, Berlin-New 
York, W. de Gruyter, 2004. 
                                                            
10 Cf. Kritik der praktischen Vernunf, AA, V, 61. 
11 Cf. Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, VI, 418. 
Some Notes on Law, Reason and Moral Sentiment in the Kantian Lectures on Natural Law 
 207 
Kant, Immanuel, Lezioni sul diritto naturale, edited by Norbert Hinske and Gianluca 
Sadun Bordoni, Milano, Bompiani, 2016. 
Rauscher, Frederick, Review of H. Delfosse-N. Hinske-G. Sadun Bordoni, Kant-Index, 
Band 30, Kant Review, 17 (2), 2012, p. 357-365. 
Ritter, Christian, Der Rechtsgedanke Kants nach den frühen Quellen, Frankurt a.M., 
Klostermann, 1971. 
Wieacker, Franz, A History of Private Law in Europe, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000. 
GIANLUCA SADUN BORDONI 
Università degli Studi di Teramo 
gsadunbordoni@unite.it 
 
